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I.—The “Gift” of Speech in Homer and Hesiod

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“To be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds” is the most concentrated formulation of Homer’s heroic ideal.<sup>1</sup> Peleus bade Phoenix give Achilles instruction in these two arts and he assigned him to Achilles as his companion in the Trojan war because Achilles (so at least the poet of Book 9 assumes) “did not yet know about hand to hand fighting or about the assembly where men win distinction” (*Il.* 9.440 f.).

On another occasion when the *Iliad* refers to Achilles’ and Patroclus’ departure into war a somewhat different tale is told. Peleus exhorted his son “always to be the best and excel the others” — which is an alternative formulation of the heroic ideal, with the emphasis, it would seem, more exclusively on distinction in battle; yet, as if to balance this impression, Menoetius at the same time reminds Patroclus that Achilles is superior in fighting strength but that Patroclus, being the elder of the two, may have occasion to assist him with *good counsel*: ὁ δὲ πείσεται εἰς ἀγαθὸν περ (11.784 [cf. 6.208]; 786–89).

As a matter of fact, while the ideal is to combine distinction in battle with excellence as a speaker, these two outstanding qualities are not normally found in one and the same Homeric character. For one thing, age makes a difference. Nestor, who (if we take his word for it) was once a fighter of very high order,<sup>2</sup> is now the

<sup>1</sup> *Il.* 9.443. Cf. Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, 2nd Eng. ed. (New York 1945) 1.8.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. *Il.* 1.260 (note however 273); 11.670 ff. The age motif is introduced also at *Il.* 9.57; 19.216 (Odysseus and Achilles). For the antithesis between the two

outstanding βουληφόρος. On the other hand Diomedes is politely told — by Nestor — that while he is very outstanding in battle and also the best of his own generation in council and while his μῦθος deserves high praise he still is after all young and thus: οὐ τέλος ἔκειο μύθων.<sup>3</sup> Yet age is not the only criterion. Hector and Polydamas were born in the same night, yet the one is as definitely superior in the works of war as the other is in wisdom and balanced judgment. The *Iliad* includes only one reference to their precisely equal age,<sup>4</sup> and one may think that the poet on this one but crucial occasion made a special point of it to provide a telling illustration for his conviction that the gods do not bestow all gifts on one and the same man.

If the heroic ἀρετή is thus split up into two distinct "forms" (εἶδη), it may not be fanciful to find in the tributes that are paid to the eminent speaker the first recognition of intellectual excellence. Here we are face to face with the beginnings of the development which was to lead to a constantly increased emphasis on the element of νοῦς, φρόνησις, or ἐπιστήμη until with Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics they are integral and decisive ingredients of every ἀρετή, including even ἀνδρεία if it is to be genuine ἀνδρεία.<sup>5</sup> For what counts in the Homeric speaker is not eloquence, or at least not eloquence alone, but the content of his speech. Behind the words, the μῦθοι, the audience senses the speaker's superior understanding and insight, his νοῦς. There is certainly in Homer no *discidium linguae atque cordis*.<sup>6</sup>

To be outstanding either in the one sphere or in the other is the goal to which the Homeric heroes aspire. If they attain it they are admired by their peers (as well as by their inferiors); they may also justly pride themselves on their worth. At the same time, however,

excellences see 4.400; 18.106 (a dubious line) and the passages cited in note 6. In the most recent analytical study of the *Iliad* (P. Von der Mühll, *Kritisches Hypomnema zur Ilias* [Basel 1952] 215, 272) all these passages are attributed to the same poet ("B").

<sup>3</sup> 9.53 ff.; cf. R. Harder, *Hermes* 80 (1952) 382.

<sup>4</sup> 18.249 ff.; on Hector and Polydamas see also 22.99 ff.; 12.210 ff.; 13.726 ff. (see below). Cf. Harder, *loc. cit.* 383, Erwin Wolff, *Platos Apologie* (Berlin 1930) 80.

<sup>5</sup> Thuc. 2.40.3 ff. should be noted as an important intermediary stage. For Plato see *Lach.* 198c ff., *Prot.* 350c, 360d and also *Rep.* 429c ff. (*Leg.* 968A is different); for Aristotle see *Eth. Nic.* 1115B.17 (in conjunction with 1102B.25, 1114B.29); for the Stoics Zenon fr. 199 ff., Chrysippus fr. 256, in von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.*, 4 vol. (Leipzig 1903–1924); see also Max Adler's Index of this work s.v. ἀνδρεία and ἀνδρείος; see further Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* 4.51; *De off.* 1.80.

<sup>6</sup> Cic. *De orat.* 3.61 (see the entire section 3.56 ff., a very interesting historical sketch of Greek education); cf. Jaeger (above, note 1) 1.8, and note 19.

it is understood that the one as well as the other excellence is a gift of the gods. It is because the gods do not give all gifts to the same man that Hector would do well to listen to the advice of Polydamas — he cannot himself "choose" these "gifts"; if he could he would have appropriated both.<sup>7</sup> In a passage of the *Odyssey* (8.169 ff.) which we shall later study in some detail it is said that a man may be far from impressive to look at, "but a god adorns his appearance with words," i.e., gives him eloquence. Whoever has received a "gift" of this kind is a favorite of Zeus or of the gods in general, or of "a god" (*θεός*):<sup>8</sup> it does not seem to make much difference which way it is put; nor is there in the epics any attempt to speculate about the reasons for which the gift was bestowed or the circumstances under which it was received.

To none of the poets whose work is incorporated in the two epics does it ever occur to regard his own profession as in any way comparable to the performance of the wise and convincing counsellor. The knowledge which the poet has received from the Muses is evidently a gift *sui generis*. The only passage that incorporates something approximating a comparison is found in Book 13 (726–34) of the *Iliad* and is significantly a part of the speech in which Polydamas reminds Hector of the diversity of their respective gifts or excellences (in the hope that his specific advice will be more readily received if it is prefaced by such general reflections). Here the conventional antithesis between excellence in war and excellence in council has been expanded by the introduction of still other gifts. To one, we read, a god has given *πολεμῖα ἔργα*, to another *ὀρχηστὺς*, to still another *κίθαρις καὶ αἰοιδή*; and finally (for this is what Polydamas has been working up to) there is the man to whom Zeus has given *νόος ἐσθλός*, which is a boon to many people and has often brought rescue. Here the poet's peculiar gift seems to have been put on a par with the two generally recognized basic excellences. The line (731) *ἀλλ' ὃν ὀρχηστὺν, ἐτέρῳ κίθαριν καὶ αἰοιδὴν* is indeed interesting — yet only because it runs counter to the true spirit of the early poets. The line has no standing in the early tradition

<sup>7</sup> *Il.* 13.729. Paris (*Il.* 3.64 f.) too makes a distinction between the gifts bestowed by the gods and what a man himself would "choose" if he could. On "choosing" and "being given" see also E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 80. Man's choice comes in at a different point, as the famous *προαίρεσις* of Achilles (*Il.* 18.94 ff.) shows. The idea of "choosing" one's (form of) life is of decidedly later origin.

<sup>8</sup> Note the changes occurring in 3.726 ff. (727, 730, 732); for "the gods" see e.g. 1.290; for Zeus also e.g. 9.37.

and was as far as we can tell unknown to the Alexandrian critics. A scholion<sup>9</sup> informs us that Zenodotus of Mallos insisted on putting it in; that it is carried in some of our manuscripts and omitted in others is of secondary importance. Even if it were better attested our verdict should be that the line can be spared.<sup>10</sup> For the essence of Polydamas' reproach, as formulated in the first two verses of his speech, is that Hector, since a god has given him *πολεμῆια ἔργα*, desires also to excel the others in knowledge and *βουλῇ*. The reference to dancing and to lyre and song deflects the straightforward movement of Polydamas' argument and introduces something utterly irrelevant to the situation. And one may easily imagine that a late rhapsode here availed himself of the opportunity for complimenting the festive crowd before which he recited on its graceful dances, while at the same time securing for his own profession a place in the traditional scheme.

If we now try to visualize Hesiod's attitude to his professional activity against the background of this Homeric tradition, a number of characteristic differences will immediately strike the eye. Yet what we now wish to emphasize is not primarily that the gift of poetry has for him become a very personal experience, and the giving and receiving of it a unique event connected with a specific place and a particular time, nor that he speaks of the Muses with a new devotion and intensity of feeling.<sup>11</sup> These things are well known and we will regard them as accepted. We will also merely touch on the fact that the Homeric ideal of excellence with its bipartite division is absent in Hesiod and does not seem to matter in his scheme of things.<sup>12</sup> What interests us here is Hesiod's new conception of persuasive speech. Hesiod is convinced that the successful speaker owes his "gift" to the same deities who have given himself the capacity of song and true knowledge about the gods. The hymn on the Muses in the proem of the *Theogony* turns from the blessings of poetry to an equally enthusiastic celebration of this other "favor" that the Muses bestow.<sup>13</sup> In Hesiod's own environment the "kings"

<sup>9</sup> T schol. *ad loc.* (*Scholía Graeca in Iliadem Townleyana*, ed. Ernestus Maass [Oxford 1888]).

<sup>10</sup> Walter Leaf, *The Iliad* (London 1902) *ad loc.*, calls the line a "tasteless interpolation."

<sup>11</sup> *Theog.* 1-114; on Hesiod's personal experience see lines 21-35. For a recent study see Kurt Latte, "Hesiods Dichterweihe" in *AuA* 2 (1946) 152 ff.

<sup>12</sup> For Hesiod's new conception of human *ἀρετή* see *Op.* 286.

<sup>13</sup> *Theog.* 80-103. I do not hesitate to consider every line of this section as genuine. Felix Jacoby in his edition (*Hesiodi carmina* 1 [Berlin 1930]) suggests that

or nobles are the recipients of this favor. Effective speech is for Hesiod not one of the two outstanding excellences of man but one of the two gifts of the Muses. Where the poets of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* say: "Zeus," or "a god," or "the gods have given" and leave it at that without wishing to scrutinize things any further, Hesiod finds himself able to identify the giver precisely. If (as we shall suggest) Hesiod borrows some of the points that he makes in praise of eloquent speech from a passage in the *Odyssey*, we must regard it as highly characteristic that while this passage (*Od.* 8.170) speaks of the eloquent man as owing his gift to "a god," Hesiod asserts *τοίη Μουσᾶων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν* (93).

This seems to be the only instance in which Hesiod expanded the sphere of a deity whom he knew from tradition. For, on the whole, his inclination is rather to create new deities who are to take care of those aspects or conditions of life that he did not find properly represented in the Homeric world of gods. Curiously enough, in the *Works and Days*, Hesiod (if the lines in question are genuine) knows a goddess Peitho, whose concern is, however, not so much with soothing speech as with the "persuasive" effects of feminine beauty.<sup>14</sup>

In the awakening political life of the Greek city states the Homeric appreciation of the wise counsellor and persuasive speaker — even of the mellifluous speaker<sup>15</sup> — is likely to have prevailed over Hesiod's new approach to this gift. This approach remained an episode. Still, it is noteworthy that the same early period which

the lines originally belonged to proems of other poets. I see no justification for this radical view; if a defense of the genuineness is needed it will be found in Wilamowitz' illuminating discussion, *Die Ilias und Homer*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1920) 474 ff., to which I refer in particular for the interpretation of lines 88–90 (page 475, note 2) and 94–103, sections which *prima facie* may arouse some doubt. In 88–90 Hesiod states a reason why the kings deserve to be called *ἐχέφρονες*. This reason is based on the function which they perform in his community. The sentences give the impression of being a new interpretation of a traditional epithet and it may at least be supposed that in an epic poem Hesiod had found the adjective *ἐχέφρονες* connected with the noun *βασιλῆς*. Cf. Wilamowitz on *κηρυτρεφής*, *Op.* 418 (*Hesiodos Erga* [Berlin 1928] *ad loc.*).

<sup>14</sup> *Op.* 73: on the probable genuineness of this section see my *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca 1949) 78, note 12. Πειθῶ also heads the list of wells who in the *Theogony* (349) are daughters of Oceanus and Tethys. This is a curious name and even in this catalogue of very carefully chosen proper names nothing comparable can be found — unless at 352 we prefer the Πεισιθόη of some MSS to the Πασιδόη of others (and Πασιδέα of the scholia). The name is perhaps the only one in this catalogue that refers primarily to the sound of a spring. If persuasive words *ρεῖ μελιχα*, the gentle flow of a well may conversely remind us of persuasive speech.

<sup>15</sup> See Tyrnt. 9.8.

appraised wise speech as a form of human excellence also recognized rhetoric as a sister art of poetry. Clearly, here are two different conceptions of rhetoric. Both were bequeathed to posterity, and posterity made little effort to reconcile these diverse views but found it possible to accept both with a good and untroubled conscience.<sup>16</sup>

What is Hesiod's justification for placing poetry and the art of persuasion under the protection of the same deities? What similarities did he perceive? Hesiod's Muses speak the truth, and his kings are expected to settle the disputes and quarrels of the community by passing "straight" sentences;<sup>17</sup> yet these two "values," truth and justice, do not seem for Hesiod to lie in the same plane.<sup>18</sup> His words point to common denominators of a different kind. Of the king who speaks well he says: τοῦ ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μέλιχα (84). This is close to the description of the poet γλυκερὴ οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αἰδὴ, and very similar language is also used of the Muses themselves when Hesiod describes their singing in the halls of Zeus: τῶν δ' ἀκάματος ῥέει αἰδὴ ἐκ στομάτων ἡδεῖα.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, what Hesiod says about the poet's capacity of allaying grief and inducing forgetfulness is comparable to what he makes the kings achieve μαλακοῖσι

<sup>16</sup> For Gorgias, cf. note 20. Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle perceive significant parallels between rhetoric and poetry — parallels of structure, of moral effect, of ψυχαγωγία, and even of educational desirability or undesirability — yet only Isocrates would consider εὖ λέγειν a way towards ἀρετή (see e.g. *Nic.* 1 ff.). In later theory the doctrine of the *χαρακτήρες* and certain stylistic categories like χάρις and ὕψος are applied to both rhetoric and poetry. At the same time εὖ λέγειν remained an ideal of Greek education (for the prevalence of rhetoric in later Greek education see H. I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* [Paris 1948] 269 ff.). The affinity of rhetorical and poetical theory is illustrated by the fact that, e.g., the doctrine of ἡθῆ is transferred from (Aristotle's) rhetoric into Hellenistic poetics (see Hor. *Ars poet.* 156 ff.). On the whole, cf. W. Kroll, *Stud. z. Verständnis d. röm. Lit.* (Stuttgart 1924) 107 ff. and *passim*; Helen North, *Traditio* 8 (1952) 1 ff.; see also my Foreword to the Random House volume *Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric* (New York 1954).

<sup>17</sup> *Theog.* 28. On Hesiod's Muses and their concern with truth see again Latte (above, note 11) 159 ff. There can be no doubt about the importance of the ἀλήθεια motif for Hesiod's own attitude to his poetry; still, it is noteworthy that Hesiod nowhere in his extensive poem reverts to it, but prefers to dwell on the delight created by the Muses (also none of the names of the Muses that are set forth in 77 ff. has any relation to the truth motif). For δίκη see *Theog.* 86, *Op.* 248 ff.

<sup>18</sup> I am not altogether sure of this; note that at *Theog.* 233 Nereus is extolled as ἀληθής (ἀψευδής, νημερτής) as well as δίκαιος (235 f.). He also is called ἥπιος, which word in turn is very close to μέλιχος (see the use of both words in the verses on Leto, 407 f.).

<sup>19</sup> For the poet see *Theog.* 97 (94 ff. and 98 ff. suggest that Hesiod is here again concentrating on the poet; yet it may be well not to be too strict about this point, since the reference in 96 to men beloved by the Muses may be taken as covering not only the poets but also the "kings"); for the Muses, see 39 f.

παραφάμενοι ἐπέεσσι;<sup>20</sup> for they too seem to have a calming and soothing effect inasmuch as people are talked out of their tense and angry mood and — perhaps — forget their grievances. The kings whom Hesiod here has in mind do not *impose* judgments but rely on their gift of gentle persuasion — an appeal to reason — to settle the disputes. Hesiod draws his picture of the kings who give straight verdicts and do so by persuasion in opposition to the *Iliad* passage from which he borrows the phrase (δια)κρίνειν θέμιστας.<sup>21</sup> In that passage "crooked judgment" is imposed, and is imposed βίᾳ. When he wrote the *Works and Days* he had reason for reproducing the *Iliad* passage more closely.

The larger part of the proem extols the Muses as inventors and patronesses of dance, song, poetry, and festal joy, and ends with an enumeration of their names which symbolize these activities. The last to be mentioned is Calliope.<sup>22</sup> She is προφερεστάτη ἀπάσεων, and it is she who also stands by the side of kings. Though for a moment it may seem to be his wish to associate the gift of speech with Calliope in particular, he has in truth no such intention; for the very next line (81) refers again to the entire group of "daughters of great Zeus." Still, we can easily see that the name of Calliope allowed him a far better transition to the subject of persuasive speech than, for instance, that of Terpsichore or Melpomene. It is in his voice — his tongue (γλῶσση) — that the good king's capacity of gentle persuasion resides (83 ff.). Calliope's designation as προφερεστάτη may well have been chosen with a view to preparing this transition; she stands more obviously than any of the others for the twofold gift of the Muses.

The king's gift is, however, not like the poet's the result of an "awakening" or "calling." If he has the power of peacefully settling disputes about property rights and other matters (87) he has always had it, and this implies that his relation to the Muses

<sup>20</sup> *Theog.* 90; with λημοσύνην κακῶν (55) cf. δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται (102). See Hermann Fränkel, *Dichtung u. Philos. d. frühen Griechentums* (New York 1951) 150. Gorgias, in the section (8 f.) of the *Helene* which defines "all poetry" as λόγος in metrical form, mentions among the highest ("most divine") achievements of the λόγος that it is able λῦπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι.

<sup>21</sup> *Il.* 16.387 ff. The relation of this passage to Hesiod's work has often been studied. The fairest appraisal of its significance for him is probably Wilamowitz' *Hesiodos Erga* 66. For the connection of justice and gentleness see above, note 18.

<sup>22</sup> Lines 75 ff.; see esp. 79 ff. On the role assigned to Calliope cf. Wilamowitz, *Ilias und Homer* 474. For the names of the Muses and of Calliope in particular see *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (above, note 14) 38 ff., 41.

cannot be expressed in the same terms as Hesiod's own. In fact, he had the "gift" from birth, and while he is (as Hesiod does not fail to emphasize, 82, 96) under the special protection of Zeus, yet the Muses too "honor" him. They "looked upon him when he was born." The motif *γεινόμενον ἐσίδωσι* represents a conception of *δόσις* quite different from the vision and the calling which Hesiod himself experienced. Still, it is Hesiod's very personal experience which has prompted him to wonder about the "how" and "when" of the parallel gift, questions which the poets of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, as we have seen, never felt prompted to ask. We do not know whether he found the answer in the depths of his own religious consciousness or whether he is giving poetic form to a belief regarding divine protection which was current in his environment. That the motif was destined later to be transferred to the poet concerns us here as little as the more or less arbitrary selection of a particular Muse, e.g., in Horace ("quem tu Melpomene semel nascentem placido videris lumine . . .").<sup>23</sup>

In his praise of the king's persuasive speech Hesiod as usual borrows and transposes elements of the Homeric language. He found in Homer phrases descriptive of gentle, soothing words which suited his purpose, and he appears in particular to have had fixed in his mind the characterization of Nestor's eloquence: *τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδὴ*, a line which seems to be echoed in our section of the *Theogony* when Hesiod says *τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσση γλυκερὴν χέλουσιν ἔερσην* and also slightly later in the words *γλυκερὴ οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδὴ*.<sup>24</sup>

More important than such influences on the language of our section, and in a sense crucial for the right appreciation of Hesiod's originality, is a passage in Book 8 of the *Odyssey* (167 ff.). Odysseus' reply to Euryalus, the handsome young man at the court of Alcinous who has taunted him as a weakling, includes a number of lines whose phrasing is similar and in part identical with Hesiod's account of the eloquent king. The conclusion that one poet knew the other's work is in fact inevitable, and current opinion strongly inclines to the view that the passage in the *Odyssey* is influenced by the *Theogony*. In this paper too it would hardly be fair to ignore the question who has influenced whom, yet it may be permissible to look at these closely related passages first from a somewhat different

<sup>23</sup> *Carm.* 4.3.1 f.; see also Callim. *Epigr.* 21.5.

<sup>24</sup> *Il.* 1.249; *Theog.* 83, 97.



point of view (which in the general eagerness to decide the issue of priority has perhaps been unduly neglected). For the passages in the *Odyssey* and in the *Theogony* seem to present an epitome of the differences between Hesiod's approach to the gift of speech and that prevailing in the Homeric poems. This makes the questions of priority and originality perhaps even more exciting; yet we shall not be in a hurry to tackle them.

Here are the two passages:

τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ρεῖ μείλιχα· οἱ δέ τε λαοὶ  
πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὀρώσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας  
ἰθείησι δίκησιν· ὃ δ' ἀσφαλῶς ἀγορεύων  
αἰψά τε καὶ μέγα νείκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσεν.

(the three following verses are omitted as irrelevant for our purpose)

ἐρχόμενον δ' ἂν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὥς ἱλάσκονται  
αἰδοὶ μιλίχην, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγορμένοισιν·  
τοῖη Μουσῶων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν. *Theog.* 84 ff.

ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἶδος ἀκινδνότερος πέλει ἀνὴρ,  
ἄλλα θεὸς μορφήν ἔπεισι στέφει· οἱ δέ τ' ἐς αὐτὸν  
τερπόμενοι λεύσσουσιν, ὃ δ' ἀσφαλῶς ἀγορεύει  
αἰδοὶ μιλίχην, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγορμένοισιν,  
ἐρχόμενον δ' ἂν' ἄστνυ θεὸν ὥς εἰσορώσιν.  
ἄλλος δ' αὖ εἶδος μὲν ἀλίκιος ἀθανάτοισιν . . . *Od.* 8.169 ff.

In the passage of the *Odyssey* the guiding idea is once more that the gods distribute their gifts and do not allow one man to be distinguished by all of them.<sup>25</sup> The differentiation here made is however not between "works of war" and wise advice in council, but, as is more in keeping with life on the island of the Phaeacians and indeed with the *Odyssey* as a whole, between beauty of appearance and the capacity of influencing people by one's speech. It is the description of the latter gift which includes the parallels to the *Theogony*.<sup>26</sup> Yet the gift of speech is here (170) again attributed to "a god" — if the poet was familiar with the *Theogony* he must have

<sup>25</sup> Critics are probably right in holding that this thought was made explicit in the apparently corrupt first line of the passage (v. 167), where H. Düntzer, *Homeri Odyssea* (Paderborn 1875), changed the reading of the MSS οὕτως οὐ πάντεσσι θεοὶ χαρίεντα διδοῦσι to οὐχ ἅμα πάντα θεοὶ χ. δ.

<sup>26</sup> On a man's εἶδος as "gift of Aphrodite" cf. *Il.* 3.54 f. where Hector (speaking to Paris) doubts that it may be found combined with πολεμῆμα ἔργα.

ignored the fact that the divine giver had in the meantime been identified. As in Hesiod the people look (this time even with pleasure) at the eloquent orator; he speaks ἀσφαλέως and αἰδοί μελιχίῃ (both motifs recur in Hesiod); μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν is identical in both descriptions, while ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ ἄστν θεὸν ὥς εἰσορόωσιν has its analogue in ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὥς ἱλάσκονται.<sup>27</sup> The slight difference in the wording is symptomatic of the fact that the motive of settling legal disputes, the διακρίνειν θέμιστας, is absent in the *Odyssey*. In fact we can sum up the differences by saying that the *Odyssey* passage has neither the Muses nor the specific Hesiodic setting of the rural community where the kings act as judges. The poet of the *Odyssey* passage seems to think of the speaker's performance in the assembly where matters of common concern are under discussion. For the rest, we are back in the traditional Homeric pattern of gifts distributed among several persons rather than accumulated in one, and the giver himself is an indefinite θεός.

It may now be time to turn to the vexed question of priority.<sup>28</sup> In the light of our observations we may formulate the alternatives thus: Did the poet of the *Odyssey* passage borrow elements of Hesiod's description yet force them back into the preëstablished scheme, leaving out the specific Hesiodic thought that the speaker owes his inspiration to the Muse as well as the specific Hesiodic situation of the king-judge — and indeed generally all reference to kings (which would not really fit either his pattern or his situation, since the impertinent Euryalus is not a king)? Or has Hesiod made use of the *Odyssey* passage because of all Homeric descriptions of a speaker it appealed to him most; has he enhanced and embellished this description by elaborating the motif of the gentle flow of words; has he brought it nearer home by working in references to the

<sup>27</sup> For the extent to which at *Theog.* 91 the MSS, the papyrus of the 4th or 5th century, and also the "indirect tradition" (Stobaeus) have come under the influence of *Od.* 8. 173, see the apparatus of Rzach or Jacoby. *Theog.* 86 (αἰψά τε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος κτλ.) has no counterpart in the *Odyssey*.

<sup>28</sup> The majority of recent interpreters side with Wilamowitz, *Ilias und Homer*<sup>2</sup> 477 ff. See e.g. Eduard Schwartz, *Die Odyssee* (Munich 1924) 224; Erich Bethe, *Homer* 2 (Leipzig 1922) 330, note 2; Inez Sellschopp, *Stilist. Untersuch. z. Hes.* (Diss. Hamburg 1934) 49; Jacoby (above, note 13) 81, note 1; P. Von der Mühl, *Homeri Odyssea* (Basel 1946) *ad loc.* For P. Cauer, who has brought forward strong counter-arguments against Wilamowitz (whereas from the other side nothing substantial or new has been added to Wilamowitz' points), see below, note 33. R. Merkelbach, *Untersuchungen zur Odyssee*, "Zetemata" 2 (Munich 1951) 174, admits that the question is still *sub judice*, yet takes his place on the side of Wilamowitz and the other scholars mentioned. See also below, note 35.

specific activity in which the kings in his own environment use their eloquence; and has he finally — or rather first and foremost — put the whole description under an entirely new aspect by treating the wonderfully effective eloquence not just as "the gift" of an indefinite god but as the other great and delightful manifestation of the same august deities to whom he had a very personal devotion?

Wilamowitz presented two main reasons for considering the poet of the *Odyssey* — more precisely of the *Odyssey* passage — as being in the debt of Hesiod.<sup>29</sup> The words αἰδοῖ μιλίχῃ in the *Theogony* seem to him to emerge naturally from the preceding reference to the kings as αἰδοῖοι and the characterization of their speech as ἐπ' (ἐκ στομάτων ῥεῖ) μείλιχα (80, 84). The consideration of this argument I wish to postpone. Also he thought it absurd that in the *Odyssey* the people should look at the gentle persuasive speaker who is of insignificant outward appearance (ἀκιδνότερος) as at a god. It seems to have been his conviction that for a person to be looked up to as a god by the early Greeks (or the Homeric Greeks) he must have a distinguished exterior. Intellectual excellence would not count for so much. This question is hard to settle on general grounds, but if more specific arguments are in order, it may be suggested that the poet of the *Odyssey* passage makes his point thus: the good speaker, though not impressive to look at, achieves through his superior insight and gentle use of persuasion that the people look at him as though he were a god,<sup>30</sup> whereas the other man, distinguished by a handsome appearance, is thereby from the beginning ἀλῖγκιος ἀθανάτοισιν<sup>31</sup> (as the very next line states) — and so much the worse if he disgraces this status by lack of good manners and of νοῦς. Thus it is at least arguable that the θεὸν ὥς has meaning in

<sup>29</sup> See above, note 13. A further argument of Wilamowitz, "ἀσφαλές wird in der alten Sprache immer so gebraucht dass man das μὴ σφάλλῃσθαι fühlt," seems to me pointless. The statement as such, while at first glance attractive, is not fully borne out by the actual usage. As for the argument which Wilamowitz draws from it, I see no reason why the characterization ("speaking without making mistakes") should not fit the speaker whom Odysseus has in mind; in fact, the argument might easily be turned against Wilamowitz by the suggestion that Euryalus, whom Odysseus takes to task, has just committed a serious σφάλμα. However, I would not wish to press this point. — Aristides, *De rhet.* 98, convincingly equates the ἀσφαλῶς of our passage with ἀπταιστως.

<sup>30</sup> *Od.* 8.173. We would readily believe that the Phaeacians look up to their queen θεὸν ὥς; nor would we doubt (even though it is not stated) that she is εἶδος ἀγῆτη. Still, the specific reason why the people regard her as a god is that she has νόος ἐσθλός and is able to settle the νεῖκεα that have arisen among the men of the community (*Od.* 7.69–74).

<sup>31</sup> The juxtaposition of the two lines (8.173 and 174) seems to me significant.

the context of the *Odyssey* passage and does not *per se* betray a thoughtless imitator.

Wilamowitz' other argument has at first sight some persuasive force, but the trouble is that it does not dispose of the difficulties inherent in the words αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ as used in the *Theogony* passage. Wilamowitz admitted that the dative is hard, and ambiguous,<sup>32</sup> and I would say that if it is really necessary to understand with Wilamowitz that the people implore the king like a god "on account of" his αἰδῶς μειλιχίῃ — which means taking the dative as equivalent to ἐπ' αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ — the expression is so awkward as to contribute a strong argument for Hesiod's dependence on the *Odyssey* passage. However, Cauer and Bethe<sup>33</sup> are probably right in regarding the words as describing the temper of the people rather than of the king: the people try to propitiate him in a spirit of soft or gentle αἰδῶς.<sup>34</sup> In this case the construction becomes easier, yet the connection between αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ and the king's ἔπεα μείλιχα is lost and with it the main force of Wilamowitz' argument that the peculiar expression αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ suggested itself to Hesiod under the influence of what he had said in preceding sentences.<sup>35</sup> Altogether it must be admitted that Hesiod had as good reasons for expanding as the poet of the *Odyssey* passage had for reducing, and that the expanding or reducing has been done in such a way as to leave few rough edges. Under these circumstances it would be rash to be dogmatic.<sup>36</sup> My

<sup>32</sup> *Op. cit.* 475, note 3.

<sup>33</sup> Paul Cauer, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik*<sup>3</sup> (Leipzig 1921) 654 f.; for Bethe see above, note 28.

<sup>34</sup> Schwartz and Von der Mühl (see note 28) would even in the *Odyssey* passage connect αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ with λείσσουσιν; this makes it necessary to regard ἀσφαλῶς ἀγορεύει as a parenthesis. To me this seems a rather high price for the belief in the priority of the *Theogony*. The interpretation sacrifices the natural and steady flow of lines 170–73 for a curious zig-zag movement, runs counter to the obvious way of understanding them, and destroys the carefully progressing "build-up" of the good speaker.

<sup>35</sup> A friendly critic has drawn my attention to *Od.* 14.205 f. where we read that the Cretan Castor θεός ὡς τίετο δῆμῳ/δλβῳ τε πλούτῳ τε καὶ νιάσι κυδαλίμοισιν. I admit that the datives of the second line may strengthen Wilamowitz' interpretation of *Theog.* 92. Yet while the passage of the *Odyssey* with its passive construction is perfectly clear and unambiguous, *Theog.* 92 remains awkward (if we follow Wilamowitz) and ambiguous, and I cannot help feeling that this would be best explained on the supposition that Hesiod here tried to fit borrowed phrases into his own context.

<sup>36</sup> Von der Mühl (above, note 28; see also *RE* Suppl. 7.717) goes too far in commenting on *Od.* 8.172: "ex Hesiodi Theogonia intelligendus." The dative αἰδοῖ in the *Odyssey* passage is of the type νόφ' δ' ἐπέβαλλεν ἱμάσθλην ("Begleitgefühl," Eduard Schwyzer, *Griech. Grammatik* [Munich 1934–1950] 2.162) and creates no difficulty.

own, admittedly subjective, feeling is that the phrase αἰδοῖ μελιχίη is somewhat too smooth and elegant for Hesiod in whose two books I have looked in vain for a comparably sophisticated use of an adjective employed for characterization.

Yet my main reason for feeling sceptical about Hesiod's originality is the feeble impression which the words μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγορόμενοισι produce at the conclusion of his description. In the *Odyssey* these words are in place and as we have seen lead on to the climax that the persuasive speaker is looked up to like a god. In the *Theogony*, on the other hand, the same words come as an anticlimax and strike one as weakly conventional after the successful speaker has already been raised to a much higher status: he has been described as the favorite of the Muses, as the judge who decides an issue, as βασιλεὺς ἐχέφρων, as implored by the people like a god.<sup>37</sup> It looks as though Hesiod, having broken away from the *Odyssey* passage<sup>38</sup> to say that the eloquent king can even settle large disputes and having then gone on to explain why the kings are called ἐχέφρονες, found himself forced to invert the order of the two remaining lines of the *Odyssey* passage since this was the only way in which they now could be worked in — and they probably appeared to him altogether too good and pertinent to be omitted.

We return once more to the passage in the *Theogony*, i.e., to Hesiod's conception of the king's speech. As we have seen, the sphere in which it operates — and in such a way as to stir Hesiod's admiration — is the settling of disputes in the community (85 ff., 88 f., 91). Here it seems to work with such truly divine efficiency that the disputing parties actually forget their grievances and are ready to accept the verdict cheerfully. As everybody knows, Hesiod himself, when he became a litigant and had his case decided by the kings, was in a far from cheerful mood. And the minor point which in our section he appears to take for granted and only

Many of Nestor's speeches in the *Iliad* and many of Odysseus's in the *Odyssey* are conceived in a spirit of αἰδῶς μελιχίη, *pace* P. Chantraine, who says (*Grammaire Homérique* 2 [Paris 1953] 358, note 1): "la construction de αἰδοῖ avec ἀγορεύει souvent adoptée ne donne pas un sens satisfaisant." I have no wish to take issue with the opinion that large parts of the Phaeacian section in our *Odyssey* are late; yet the relationship between our passages would perhaps better not be invoked in support of this opinion.

<sup>37</sup> *Theog.* 80 ff., 85, 88, 91. Cf. again Cauer (above, note 33) 655: "Der Schluss bei Hesiod mit etwas Selbstverständlichen ist matt."

<sup>38</sup> At line 87 after the words ἀσφαλῶς ἀγορεύων, which correspond to *Od.* 8.171.

mentions by the way, namely that the kings pass judgment *θείησι δίκησι* (86), became all important to him as soon as he himself was the object of a *δίκη* which he did not consider *θεῖα*. This is the experience which prompted him to write his other poem. In this the *διακρίνειν θέμιστας* of the "kings" — the fact as well as the phrase<sup>39</sup> — recurs, yet is seen under a totally different aspect. There is nothing left of that atmosphere of cloudless serenity which surrounded this function of the kings in the *Theogony*; the mellifluous speech of the kings who have decided the case is no longer an object of admiration. Instead of this, the unjust content of the decision arouses Hesiod's indignation. All that matters now is justice or injustice. It is no longer the Muses, but another deity, Dike — she too a daughter of Zeus, but representing a very different facet of his government — who is deeply interested in the kings' performance as judges (*Op.* 22 ff., 256 ff.). And instead of the almost complacent tones in which he spoke of the kings as performing with divine assistance their duties in a wholly admirable way, he now sees ruin of the entire community, *λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμὸν*, coming in the wake of judgment if it is not fairly given (238 ff.; cf. 260 ff.). Weal or woe of the community depends on the justice of the *δίκαι* which the king dispenses. It is a much darker and intenser picture that Hesiod here draws, utterly different from the almost idyllic colors in which the same actions appear in the *Theogony*. Now, even when a pleasant picture is drawn, it is of a different character and belongs to a different context (225–37). For from the realm of the Muses we have passed into that of the Horai, the "social goddesses" Dike, Eirene, and Eunomia, who at the end of the *Theogony* (901–3) are introduced as daughters of Zeus but are left in a rather insignificant or at least an undeveloped position. They come to life now<sup>40</sup> — in the *Works and Days* — called into action by another aspect of the same procedure which in the *Theogony* mattered to Hesiod only by what it appeared to have in common with his own vocation.

The possibility that the kings might use their gift of speech for the wrong end, or that instead of relying on persuasion they might decide the case on the strength of their god-given authority, is in the poem of the *Theogony* entirely left out of account. The king's

<sup>39</sup> *Op.* 221: *σκολίης δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας*.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Hesiod and Aeschylus* 36, 88.

judging is safely within the world order sanctioned by Zeus and his daughters. In the *Works and Days*, Hesiod has become aware of a possible conflict between this world order and the king’s judicial actions. These actions may result in a violation of this world order and be at variance with the spirit of one of the deities αἴ τ’ ἔργ’ ὠρεῖουσιν καταβνητοῖσιν βροτοῖσιν (*Theog.* 903). And this deity would restore her violated honor through bringing destruction on the people who have expelled her (*Op.* 224) by the act of passing crooked judgment.